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ABSTRACT 7 
The dominant transitional path towards a low carbon electricity industry for systems 8 
which have been heavily dependent upon coal is through its replacement by large scale 9 
wind farms and the widespread emergence of distributed solar. In this pathway, 10 
maintaining resource adequacy in the context of increased intermittency in generation has 11 
become a major concern. This paper examines this requirement to maintain resource 12 
adequacy and compare the costs and carbon impacts for new gas turbines or biomass 13 
conversions to achieve this in an expedient transitional way. This is formulated as a policy 14 
optimization in which the imperative is to replace existing coal with a renewable 15 
alternative (in this case study, wind) and to maintain the system security at the existing 16 
level, and thereby find the optimal subsidies, either as energy credits ("green certificates" 17 
or “contracts-for-differences”) or capital benefits ("capacity payments" or tax 18 
allowances). In a model of the GB system, the results show that that biomass-conversion 19 
outperforms investment in peaking gas turbines to deal with the transitional economic 20 
externality of extra reserve costs. In particular, the results suggest benefits of 10% lower 21 
costs of subsidies, 70% lower implied costs of carbon, and a reduction of 18% in 22 
wholesale power prices.  23 
Keywords: Renewable Energy, Biomass, Investment, Security, Carbon Price 24 
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1. Introduction 26 
Managing the transition of a carbon-intensive electricity industry towards low, or 27 
zero, carbon emissions has become a delicate balance of policy initiatives and long-term 28 
commitments. Whilst substantial subsidies have been provided to support the early stage 29 
innovations of renewable energy technologies, wind and solar in particular, a 30 
consequence of these subsidies has been a structural change in the wholesale market 31 
economics leading to lower revenues and asset impairments for incumbent fossil fuel 32 
generators [1, 2, 3]. As a consequence, further subsidies, usually in the form of capacity 33 
payments, have been required to ensure that sufficient generators remain operational and 34 
to incentivize the extra reserves that are needed to cope with the intermittency of wind 35 
and solar production [4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. The sum of these subsidies, both for stimulating the 36 
innovation in new, clean technologies and maintaining resource adequacy, together with 37 
the associated network infrastructure upgrading, are inevitably subject to government 38 
budgets and considerations of consumer impact (e.g. the Levy Control Framework in the 39 
UK [9], and the Energiewende in Germany [10]). Within a framework for medium or 40 
longer term decarbonisation of the sector, e.g. by 2030 or 2050, policy support for 41 
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decarbonisation therefore reflects, implicitly or explicitly, a dynamic policy optimization 42 
of subsidy design subject to costs, resource adequacy and carbon mitigation constraints.  43 
In the context of this, investment in gas turbine facilities to provide extra reserve 44 
capacity, as intermittent wind and solar replace coal, is often regarded as a viable 45 
transitional process, notwithstanding its carbon emissions [11, 12]. The "open cycle gas 46 
turbines" (OCGTs) are relatively low capital cost, easy to install and with the low load 47 
factors associated with peaking facilities, they are usually presumed to be the best 48 
economic option to provide the extra capacity. Indeed, the OCGT "levelised" cost is 49 
widely used a reference price for capacity payments and auction parameters, for example 50 
when governments are seeking to procure firm capacity to meet annual resource adequacy 51 
targets [13]. Nevertheless, gas generation is not low carbon, and more reserve is required 52 
as intermittent renewable resources replace the firm coal facilities. 53 
In contrast, whilst the conversion of existing coal facilities to biomass, via burning 54 
wood pellets, is also a low-carbon initiative attracting policy subsidies [14], it has not 55 
been considered in the same way as OCGTs for providing reserve. But these coal-to-56 
biomass conversions have a number of attractions: the biomass cycle, if implemented in 57 
a fully compliant way, is low carbon; the conversion costs are substantially smaller than 58 
new build; new sites and new infrastructure connections are not required and the business 59 
model for those incumbent coal generating companies does not have to change 60 
substantially. Furthermore, with the extensive global coal reserves and worldwide coal 61 
generation expected to remain substantial through to 2040 [15], biomass conversion has 62 
an appealing role to play in gradually moderating the emissions from the large stock of 63 
coal plants in operation. Nevertheless, it is clearly transitional and inferior to a complete 64 
low-carbon solution, to the extent that the full supply-chain, carbon-footprint for wood 65 
pellets can be significant depending upon the mode and distance of transportation.  66 
In the future, on the other hand, it has been well-recognized that allied to carbon 67 
capture and storage (CCS), if indeed CCS were to fulfill the long-standing aspirations of 68 
commercialization [16], biomass coal conversion would offer the possibility of being a 69 
net reducer of carbon emissions [17]. But that remains speculative, as do several other 70 
new technology solutions to maintain reserve adequacy. Storage is developing rapidly, as 71 
well as the aggregation of demand side response into “virtual power plants”, but not yet 72 
at a scale to keep pace with, and thereby provide the reserve support for, the penetration 73 
of new wind and solar. In the longer-term, renewable energy allied to storage is a desirable 74 
end-stage, but the transition is not immediate. Thus, in the meantime, new-build gas 75 
turbines continue to be advocated as the transitional peaking technology. 76 
The starting point for this paper is therefore the basic observation that the dominant 77 
path towards a low carbon electricity industry for systems which have been heavily 78 
dependent upon coal is through its replacement by large scale wind farms and the 79 
widespread emergence of distributed solar [15]. In this respect, whilst their introduction 80 
has been driven by policy determination and subsidies [18], an externality of both of these 81 
intermittent technologies is the need for extra reserve. This paper examines this 82 
requirement to maintain resource adequacy and compare the costs and carbon impacts for 83 
new gas turbines or biomass conversions to achieve this in an expedient transitional way. 84 
This is formulated as a policy optimization in which the imperative is to replace existing 85 
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coal with a renewable alternative (in this case study, wind) and to maintain the system 86 
security ("outages") at the existing level, and thereby find the optimal subsidies, either as 87 
energy credits ("green" certificates or “contracts-for-differences”) or capital benefits 88 
("capacity payments", grants or tax allowances). Further, the analysis does not presume 89 
risk-neutrality on the part of investors but aversion to downside risk, as manifest by the 90 
metrics of rating agencies (e.g. [19, 20]). Apart from the social welfare costs, the analysis 91 
computes the full supply chain implied cost of carbon for the various alternatives. The 92 
model reveals that that biomass-conversion outperforms investment in OCGTs to deal 93 
with the economic externality of extra reserve costs. In particular, the results suggest 94 
benefits of 10% lower costs of subsidies, 70% lower implied costs of carbon reduction, 95 
and a reduction of 18% in wholesale power prices.  96 
This paper therefore makes several research contributions. From an analytical 97 
perspective it develops a methodology to analyze the subsidy costs over time to replace 98 
coal with wind and at the same time maintain a reserve margin expressed as a loss of load 99 
probability (an expectation of 3 hours per year is the UK target). Furthermore, the 100 
financial viability of the replacements investments is ensured by a risk constraint on the 101 
capital coverage ratio. Therefore, the formulation involves a dynamic, multistage 102 
optimization with probabilistic risk constraints. From this model, a new comparison of 103 
energy versus capacity subsidy schemes is provided and concludes in favor of the latter. 104 
In terms of technological context, this research is the first to compare biomass 105 
conversions and gas turbines as transitional alternatives within this optimized policy 106 
framework. It concludes that the former is beneficial in terms of lower subsidies, lower 107 
wholesale prices and a lower implied cost of carbon reduction.  108 
The next section presents the formulation for the investment simulation. This is 109 
applied to a realistic case study based up the British system which has indeed been 110 
characterized by policy support for large scale offshore wind to replace an accelerated 111 
retirement of coal facilities. Whilst being a particular application, the policy insights are 112 
generalizable. Subsequent sections consider the comparisons of biomass and gas for 113 
complementing the wind replacements with their extra reserve requirements. The analysis 114 
computes the implied cost of carbon reduction, and also considers a variation in which 115 
policy-makers are somewhat risk averse in optimizing the costs of subsidy design against 116 
the twin constraints of a decarbonisation pathway and resource security. Final 117 
observations and comments conclude the paper.  118 
 119 
2. Model Formulation 120 
The stylized setting is an electricity industry (e.g. in Britain) seeking to replace its 121 
existing coal generation with offshore wind, at minimum cost of subsidies, whilst 122 
maintaining a constant security of supply margin. The analysis is a comparative static one 123 
in the sense that no forecasts are presumed for future events and parameters, rather a 124 
power industry as it exists in a target year (2016/17) is systematically varied by the 125 
replacement of coal by wind, plus the addition of either gas or biomass to maintain the 126 
same level of security. Its economic performance is determined by a market price 127 
formation model which is simulated by Monte Carlo variation of all uncertain variables. 128 
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In other words, it provides a focus on the effects of key variables and current risks for a 129 
set of target year variations, without speculation on future scenarios. 130 
Within this target year model, revenues from the market simulation model provide 131 
the basis for determining the amount of subsidies needed for the investments in new 132 
capacity to be viable. Whilst the conventional NPV of a facility gives the economic value, 133 
it is well-observed that a positive NPV is often not sufficient by itself to motivate 134 
investment in practice. Often, an incentive to invest will only occur if the debt service 135 
coverage ratios required by senior lenders can be maintained [21]. The debt service 136 
coverage ratio is defined as the total cash flow available to service debt divided by the 137 
debt repayments in a given period, usually one year, as in [20]. A new investment is 138 
therefore considered to be feasible, in the sense of being financeable, if this coverage risk 139 
is below a critical level. Specifically, a proxy criterion of 1.2 is used for capital coverage 140 
at 90% probability, implying that in any year the risk of the annuitized capital costs not 141 
being covered operational earnings plus 20%, should be less that 10%. Various wind farm 142 
financings corroborate these numbers [22, 23, 24, 25]. However, it is recognised that 143 
although such financial metrics tend to be idiosyncratic in practice, the particular values 144 
are less important to this analysis than the general principle of such a metric being applied 145 
in a consistent way across the policy variables. In particular, such a metric requires a risk 146 
simulation element to the market modelling. 147 
 Three different case studies have been considered, which are detailed below. All 148 
of them have the same purpose (to fully remove the installed capacity of coal plants and 149 
replacing with offshore wind), and for that, two different approaches are analysed: 150 
replacing the total productive capacity of coal, or just the actual production in the base 151 
year. Moreover, extra reserve capacity is required to prevent the increase of unserved 152 
energy (outages), due to wind intermittency. Extra capacity can be provided by a peak 153 
technology, the "open cycle gas turbines" (OCGTs), or a flexible baseload technology, 154 
biomass (in this case, from the conversion of existing coal facilities, via burning wood 155 
pellets). These two alternatives are evaluated for each scenario. 156 
 The research questions are analyzed in this paper with reference to the British 157 
wholesale power market when, ceteris paribus, the installed capacity of coal plants is 158 
progressively replaced by offshore wind, taking 2016 as the base year. The simulation 159 
proceeds as follows. Random exogenous variables are simulated. These include the 160 
demand (hourly), the availability of each generating unit, including wind facilities, each 161 
fuel (inter-correlated), and the carbon emissions price. Hourly demand distributions are 162 
obtained from the actual historical half-hourly data available from National Grid.  163 
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 164 
Fig. 1. Average British Merit Order in 2016. 165 
The merit order supply stack is constructed from all 320 generating units available in 166 
2016 ordered in ascending order of marginal cost (from least to most expensive). For 167 
market price formation, nuclear is always assumed to be at the bottom of the stack, 168 
although its marginal cost is higher than wind. This ensures that nuclear output is not 169 
curtailed. The market, as indicated in Figure 1, is cleared by having all active players take 170 
the price of the most expensive active generating unit needed to meet demand. If the 171 
demand is higher than the cumulative available capacity, an “outage” is recorded. 172 
Production uncertainty of each technology is simulated from binomial distributions, 173 
wind speed (used for estimating wind production) is represented by Weibull probability 174 
distribution functions, and fuel prices are specified by lognormal distributions. Wind 175 
speed is converted to power according to a typical wind-power nonlinear transfer 176 
function, as Figure 2, following [26,27,28]. The portfolio averaging of extensive wind 177 
farm penetration is modelled by considering two regions in GB, north and south. From 178 
studies on wind speeds in geographic locations [29] an output correlation index of 0.7 is 179 
taken for plants in the same geographic areas within the north or south, and an index of 180 
0.1 is used as the output correlation coefficient between the north and south plants. New 181 
offshore wind generation is assumed to be distributed evenly between north and south. 182 
 183 
 184 
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 186 
Fig. 2. Generation Output for a Typical Turbine as a function of Wind speed. 187 
 188 
Fig. 3. Average Daily Solar Generation in 2016. 189 
The hourly photovoltaic production distribution functions are obtained 190 
analogously, using the 2015 historical data [30]. In Figure 3, PV generation obtained from 191 
these distribution functions is represented. This PV production is subtracted from the 192 
demand in this modelling procedure. 193 
In the model, all (320) generating units offering into the market are included from 194 
the very small biomass, onshore and offshore wind facilities to the large nuclear stations. 195 
Installed capacities, capital costs, annual fixed costs, lifetimes, availabilities, carbon 196 
intensities and heat rates were consistent with various sources [13,14,31,32,33,34,35] and 197 
hourly demand for 2015/16 was taken from the National Grid1. The basic fuel cost 198 
parameters were specified by lognormal distributions with the follow mean and standard 199 
deviations: coal ($/tonne 80, 8); gas (p/therm 45,5); oil (£/bl 43, 4); ROC (£/ROC 45,4); 200 
and EUA carbon price floor (£/tonne 18,0). The within year correlations were estimated 201 
empirically as 0.6 for Gas and Oil; 0.6 for Gas and Coal; 0.8 for Coal and Oil. 202 
No allowances were made for start-up costs. Transmission constraints do not 203 
factor into wholesale market prices, as they are part of the real-time system balancing 204 
                                                            
1 http://www.nationalgrid.com/UK 
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activities. No demand elasticity is assumed. Unplanned outages are simulated according 205 
to binomial distributions based upon average availabilities. Finally marginal cost clearing 206 
prices as simulated for the whole year were given a 15% mark-up to provide a good 207 
calibration to actual 2016 data. 208 
Using the above annual price simulation model, the analysis proceeds by 209 
optimising the amount of extra reserve capacity needed to maintain the same security as 210 
in 2016 whilst replacing the coal with offshore wind. More precisely, the objective 211 
function (OF), which is minimised in the optimisation, is the mean value of the total 212 
subsidies required in the process of removing coal generation (1), subject to constraints. 213 
Total cost of subsidies (TS) is calculated as the sum of subsidies to new offshore wind 214 
and extra capacity. The subsidies can be either green certificates or capital grants. 215 
݉݅݊ሼܱܨ ൌ ݉݁ܽ݊ሺܶܵሻሽ (1)
 216 
It is subject to a constraint (2), to maintain the security of supply. To do so, the 217 
limit on outages during the process is set as the risk of outages in the base year, based on 218 
the simulation of the model with 5,000 iterations to ensure a stable value. We found from 219 
the simulations that the appropriate base mean outage value (expected energy unserved) 220 
was 1050 MWh. Note that the precise British reliability standard of 3 hrs Loss of Load 221 
Expectation, has not been used, but the model maintains consistency with the status quo 222 
in 2016. The actual value of this expected energy unserved is not crucial to this analysis 223 
as the key results relate to the changes from a base level. 224 
݉݁ܽ݊ሺ݋ݑݐ݃ሻ ൑ 1050 ሾܯܹ݄ሿ (2)
 225 
The objective function is also subject to an investment constraint (3), to ensure an 226 
adequate profitability to investors in extra reserve capacity. In this case, a capital coverage 227 
ratio (CR) of 1.2 with a 90% confidence is considered. 228 
݌݁ݎܿ݁݊ݐ݈݅݁ଵ଴%ሺܥܴሻ ൒ 1.2 (3)
 229 
Capital coverage ratios are calculated as the as shown in (4), where PR refers to 230 
annual profits, G refers to annual capital grants, and PAY refers to the annuitized capital 231 
payments (ACP) and fixed payments related to O&M, calculated as shown in Eq. (5), 232 
where C refers to installed capacity. The associated data are displayed in Table 1. In order 233 
to avoid issues of gearing, it is assumed for simplicity that the capital coverage ratio 234 
covers both debt and equity and this is discounted at a cost of capital to account for both. 235 
ܥܴ ൌ ܴܲ ൅ ܩܲܣܻ  
 
(4)
ܲܣܻ ൌ ሺܣܥܲ ൅ ܱ&ܯሻ ∙ ܥ 
 
(5) 
 236 
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TECHNOLOGY Capital Costs (CC) [£/kW] 
Interest 
rate [%] 
Lifespan 
(Y) [Years] 
ACP  
[£/kW] 
O&M Costs 
[£/kW] 
Offshore wind 2,800.00 7 20 264.30 48.00 
OCGT 440.00 7 25 37.76 9.50 
Biomass (conversion) 321.00 7 20 30.30 22.00 
Table 1. Data to calculate annuitized payments. 237 
Two types of subsidy mechanisms are considered. "Green Certificates" are an energy 238 
credit, widely used internationally and provide a supplement to the market prices for 239 
producers of renewable energy. They are known as Renewable Obligation Certificates 240 
("ROCs") in the UK. An alternative to an energy payment is a capital payment on the 241 
investment. This can take the form of a fiscal benefit or a capacity payment. This as a 242 
"grant" in this analysis. Biomass could receive either an energy subsidy, ROC, or a 243 
capacity grant; but OCGTs can only receive capacity payments. In both cases, this model 244 
optimises the levels to ensure that constraint (3) is achieved. 245 
 246 
3. Replacement of Coal by Offshore wind 247 
In this transition scenario, total available production capacity of coal (COA) is replaced 248 
by offshore wind (WOF), following the formula described in Eq. (6), where af refers to 249 
the availability factor of each technology (coal, 87%; offshore wind, 45%; OCGT: 94%; 250 
biomass: 87%). 251 
ܥଵ଴଴%ௐைி ൌ ܥ଴%ௐைி ൅ ሺܥ଴%஼ை஺ െ ܥଵ଴଴%஼ை஺ ሻ ൉ ݂ܽ
஼ை஺
݂ܽௐைி ൌ 4,705 ൅ ሺ13,737 െ 0ሻ ൉
0.87
0.45 ൌ 31,263 (6)
 252 
Extra capacity requirements, either biomass or OCGT, are also optimised to satisfy the 253 
probabilistic security constraint. Installed capacity [MW] of coal, offshore wind, and 254 
OCGT or biomass, under 0% and 100% coal replacement are shown in Table 2. 255 
TECHNOLOGY 0% 100% 
Coal 13,737 0
Offshore wind 4,705 31,263  
Biomass 2,226 4,653  
OCGT 2,020 4,296  
Table 2. Case 1: Capacities in MW for coal replacement based upon installed availability. 256 
The above replacement is based on installed capacity adjusted by technical availability 257 
factors. However, with a high carbon floor price of £18/tCO2 , the load factor of the coal 258 
plant in 2016 is low and so it would be appropriate to also consider the working hours 259 
(load factor) replacement of coal by offshore wind. In this second scenario therefore, coal 260 
energy production is replaced by offshore wind, following the formula described in (7), 261 
where wh refers to the 2016 working hours of each technology (coal: 1,200 hours, and 262 
offshore wind: 8,760 hours), again adjusted by technical availability factors. Installed 263 
capacities [MW] are detailed in Table 3. Evidently much less wind is installed but more 264 
peaking plant is required to maintain the same security. 265 
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ܥଵ଴଴%ௐைி ൌ ܥ଴%ௐைி ൅ ܥ଴%஼ை஺ ൉ ݂ܽ
஼ை஺ ൉ ݓ݄଴%஼ை஺
݂ܽௐைி ൉ ݓ݄ௐைி  (7)
 266 
TECHNOLOGY 0% 100% 
Coal 13,737 0 
Offshore wind 4,705 8,343  
Biomass 2,226 11,318  
OCGT 2,020 12,541  
Table 3. Case 2: Capacities in MW for coal replacement based upon load factor. 267 
To see the effect of the carbon floor at £18/tCO2, the above scenario is repeated using an 268 
EU ETS market price average of £5/tCO2. This reduces the coal generators' marginal costs 269 
to below those of the CCGTs and accordingly the average operational hours go to 5,379 270 
from 1,200 hours, previously. Therefore, its production is higher in the base year, and 271 
more offshore wind is needed. Installed capacities [MW] are detailed in Table 4. 272 
TECHNOLOGY 0% 100% 
Coal 13,737 0 
Offshore wind 4,705 21,013 (16,308 new) 
Biomass 2,226 8,023 (5,797 new) 
OCGT 2,020 7,616 (5,596 new) 
Table 4. Case 3: Capacities in MW for coal replacement based upon load factor with low carbon price. 273 
To assess the decarbonisation achieved in each of the three scenarios, the percentage of 274 
CO2 emissions reduced is calculated. Estimates are used of the full supply chain carbon 275 
emissions per MWh generated, i.e. carbon emission intensities of 1.00 tCO2/MWh for 276 
coal, 0.53 tCO2/MWh for OCGT and 0.28 tCO2/MWh for biomass. These are different 277 
from the carbon intensities used in the market price simulations (which are not based upon 278 
the full supply chain). This in the market, biomass is considered carbon neutral, but in the 279 
overall accounting, included are the total emissions from the cultivation, harvesting, 280 
processing and transport of the biomass feedstocks. And to follow the same criterion for 281 
coal and OCGT, final emission intensities of these two technologies are increased by 10% 282 
over their usual market levels to account for transport. Results for each scenario and 283 
alternative are represented in Fig. 4. 284 
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 285 
Fig. 4. Percentage of CO2 emissions reduced according to replacement assumptions. 286 
Replacing coal by offshore wind typically leads to a drop of wholesale electricity prices. 287 
However, when the amount of offshore wind introduced is small and a peaking 288 
technology with high marginal costs is used to provide extra capacity, spot prices might 289 
consequently remain at the same level or even increase. Moreover, the subsidy scheme 290 
used to pay the subsidies also affects prices. For that reason, in the following chart, 291 
biomass is divided into two groups: “ROCs”, for energy subsidies, and “Grants”, for 292 
capacity payments. The variation of daily average electricity prices is shown in Fig. 5. 293 
There is a beneficial effect on reducing prices for using biomass, and indeed against the 294 
background of the high carbon price floor of £18/tCO2 in Case 2, the use of OCGTs to 295 
maintain security actually increases prices slightly. 296 
 297 
Fig. 5. Daily average spot prices variation. 298 
In all scenarios, ROCs and grants for biomass and OCGT are optimised. However, the 299 
amount of subsidies to offshore wind is maintained at the same 2016 level (1.8 300 
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ROCs/MWh, i.e. about £80/MWh in addition to the wholesale price around £35/MWh), 301 
which is significantly higher than the optimised value of 0.3 ROCs/MWh for biomass). 302 
As a consequence, the larger the installed capacity of offshore wind, the higher the total 303 
subsidies. Although dominated by the cost of subsidising the wind with this base case of 304 
high ROCs, it is discernible in Case 2 that supporting biomass with capital grants can lead 305 
to a marginal saving compared to using green certificates, and compared to maintaining 306 
security via OCGTs.  307 
 308 
Fig. 6. Total subsidies. 309 
The base year 2016/17 was a year of rapid change in support levels for offshore wind. By 310 
September 2017, ROCs had been replaced for offshore investment by Contracts for 311 
Differences. These were determined by an auction which cleared at £57.5/MWh. Fig. 7 312 
shows the effect of this lower subsidy level, but note that the differences between the 313 
Cases do not change. 314 
 315 
Fig. 7. Total subsidies with CfD policy for offshore wind. 316 
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Finally, Fig. 8 shows the ratio between total subsidies at the 2016 level (in Fig 6) and the 317 
CO2 emissions reduced to produce an implied cost of carbon (£/tCO2) for the transition 318 
under the different cases. Evidently, there is a much higher implied cost of carbon for the 319 
transition if security is maintained with OCGTs compared to Biomass in all cases, but 320 
particularly against the background of the £18/tCO2 carbon price floor. With biomass, the 321 
implied cost of carbon is around £59/tCO2 if energy subsidies are used or about £55/tCO2 322 
with capital grants compared to about £155/tCO2 if gas is used for the security. Note that 323 
with the lower September 2017 CfD prices for offshore wind, these implied carbon costs 324 
would be reduced substantially to about a third. 325 
 326 
Fig. 8. Cost of carbon reduction. 327 
Whilst the main result of this modelling is with regard to the value of biomass 328 
conversions, compared to new OCGT facilities, for maintaining security during a coal 329 
phase-out, these results also show that subsidies need to be slightly higher if they are paid 330 
as energy benefits (green certificates, ROCs, feed-in tariffs or contracts for differences) 331 
compared to capital grants (capacity payments, fiscal benefits). This is explained by the 332 
intrinsic uncertainty of the energy-based subsidies, where dependence on the different 333 
parameters mentioned previously increases the volatility of the cash-flow received by 334 
generators. This effect can be observed in Fig. 9, where the coverage ratio probability 335 
distributions for the Grants and ROC cases are compared. Higher volatility produces more 336 
disperse coverage ratios from a wider distribution, so the tails are longer and a 10% 337 
percentile of 1.2 is more difficult to achieve. Thus, biomass requires higher subsidy with 338 
energy credits compared to capital benefits. 339 
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Fig. 9. Coverage ratio probability distributions. 342 
Furthermore, important results are obtained regarding optimal ROCs in this analysis: 343 
the ROCs required to get a coverage ratio of 1.2 is around 0.3 ROC/MWh, much less than 344 
the 1.5 ROC/MWh being paid in 2016. 345 
 346 
4. Conclusions 347 
This analysis points to positive considerations for biomass conversion if coal facilities 348 
are being phased out and replaced by intermittent renewable energy resources. The need 349 
for a transition to maintain resource adequacy at a constant level, as measured by the 350 
expected energy unserved, can be optimized by the methodology developed in this paper. 351 
An application to the British context indicates that using biomass conversion compared 352 
to gas turbines to maintain adequate reserve levels leads to lower costs (according to this 353 
analysis, they could be up to 9% lower), lower prices (they could drop by 16-18%) and a 354 
lower implied cost of carbon reduction (it could be a 70% lower). 355 
It should be emphasized that the analysis is a marginal one. It has looked at the 356 
operating reserve technology needed to maintain a system reliability target during an 357 
evolution in which a firm power source such as coal is replaced by a renewable facility 358 
such as wind or solar. The analysis is not about the widespread introduction of new-build 359 
biomass facilities for baseload, but instead, the conversion of the pre-existing coal plants, 360 
which are being decommissioned, to provide occasional reserve supplies. As such, the 361 
capital costs and supply chain implications are much less restrictive, and the practical 362 
feasibility of this analysis is plausible. Note in this context that some large coal facilities 363 
in Britain (over 2GW) have indeed been converted to biomass [36]. However, subsidies 364 
are required and the analysis shows that capacity payments rather than energy price 365 
premia are more efficient (the results suggest a benefit in the cost of subsidies of up to a 366 
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10%). This particular conclusion confronts conventional practice in many national 367 
markets. 368 
Whilst this analysis has been derived from a stylization of the British context, the key 369 
indications are generalizable. The advantage of capacity payments over energy price 370 
premia is driven mainly by considerations of financing risk, being the reduction in the 371 
lower tail of the debt-coverage risk distribution. This is a general result, but presumes a 372 
focus upon financial risk in the investment decision. The context is that of private 373 
investors in a competitive power market, and this would not generalize to a public sector 374 
decision for a national monopoly. The latter case is however becoming much less 375 
common worldwide as competitive electricity markets mature.  376 
Regarding the specific British case study of replacing coal by wind, it can be observed 377 
that other European countries are also progressing in this way, given the EU Directives 378 
for the low carbon and renewable energy transition.  The scale varies however with, for 379 
example, France having a smaller installed coal capacity of 3 GW (vs. 14 GW, in the UK) 380 
and a slower development of wind [37, 38]. For Germany, however, coal is a major source 381 
of fuel for electricity generation with around 25 GW and there has been an active 382 
development program of wind, solar and biomass [39]. Subsides for renewable energies 383 
in both France and Germany have, however, been energy premia rather than capacity 384 
payments [40, 47]. Similarly for Spain with 14% provided by coal-fired plants and 20% 385 
coming from wind power [41, 42], and in The Netherlands with more than 30% produced 386 
by coal [44] and substantial offshore wind [45]. In other words, the European context 387 
presents various member states having substantial coal plant being imminently 388 
decommissioned and an expansion of their wind resources. Elsewhere in the world, in the 389 
United States, Australia and Asia, similar trends are evident. 390 
Apart from the economic conclusions of the above analysis in favor of biomass 391 
conversion to maintain reserve levels, not costed are the attractions of a re-purposing of 392 
existing facilities. For asset owners, the attractions are clear [36]. Overall, however, one 393 
might have expected biomass coal conversions to be more widespread. Concerns about 394 
securing the supply chain are clearly very different to linking up with a pre-existing gas 395 
infrastructure. This study does not speculate on the future sustainability of biomass 396 
resources if biomass conversion were to become widespread, and these concerns may be 397 
overstated [46], but in the context of providing reserve to support wind and solar, the 398 
analysis does not envisage large-scale baseload demands upon the supply chain. It is clear 399 
furthermore that gas turbine installations are well established, reliable and well supported; 400 
whilst biomass power generation is more complicated by comparison. But with 401 
appropriate policy support this analysis suggests that biomass conversion can play a cost-402 
efficient role in the energy transition. 403 
 404 
 405 
 406 
 407 
 408 
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